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About 33 million people currently live with HIV. The disease
has reduced life expectancy by about 20 years. Nearly 12 million
children are orphaned. It is now well established that the epidemic
demands an immediate increase in resources. The main questions
that arise are where the resources will come from, and whether they
can be fully spent and absorbed.
One major source of financing for HIV and AIDS control is external
aid. A recent report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
computed the macroeconomic implications of scaling-up aid
as promised by the G-8 at Gleneagles. The assessments for Benin,
Niger and Togo indicate that scaling-up aid will put moderate to
sizable pressure on inflation and exchange rates (IMF, 2008).
The debate continues as to whether increased external assistance causes macroeconomic instability. On the one side there
are fears of a “Dutch Disease” effect. As a result, many countries’ macroeconomic and budgetary frameworks may not be
expansionary enough to scale-up MDG levels of expenditure, particularly through public spending programmes. Recently,
however, the threat of Dutch Disease as a result of aid spending has been questioned because of a lack of evidence or
contradictory data.
Several publications by the former International Poverty Centre and now International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
have emphasised the urgent need for large-scale, broadly targeted government programmes to respond to the HIV and AIDS
epidemic. The recommendations were as follows:
 fiscal and monetary policies have to be expansionary in order to respond effectively to the epidemic; and
 macroeconomic management must encourage full spending and absorption of aid.
In this Policy Research Brief we add that:
An increase in government expenditure, combined with proper micro-management through the greater coordination,
efficiency and implementation of innovative projects and programmes, will lead to a more effective response and may
prevent macroeconomic instability, as succinctly argued by Serieux et al. (2008).
II. Fears of Macro Absorption and Spending of Aid
To see how fears of macroeconomic instability have curtailed an effective response to the control of HIV and AIDS, we look
at the cases of Malawi, Zambia, and Kenya. As of 2006, Malawi had an HIV and AIDS prevalence rate of 14 per cent among
the adult population, defined as those in the 15–49 age group, while Zambia’s prevalence rate in 2007 stood at 14.3 per cent.
In response to the crisis, HIV-related resource flows have increased significantly in both countries and the projections are that
more resources will be forthcoming. Kenya’s prevalence rate is much lower, having fallen from 14 per cent in 2001 to 7.8 per
cent in 2007. Nonetheless, controlling HIV and AIDS remains a pressing issue in this country as well. Although there has been
an overall decline in the aid that Kenya receives, it is still one of the top 10 recipients of assistance for HIV and AIDS control.
Malawi, Zambia and Kenya are thus confronting a human development crisis and all of them receive resources to respond
effectively—but they are not using these resources fully. Why?
Recently, IPC’s One Pager #67 showed the state of aid spending and absorption before and during the aid surge periods.
The findings are summarised in Tables 1, 2 and 3 (See next page).International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth 2
Malawi absorbed the available aid, but only 59 per cent was
spent through government fiscal expansion. As a result of high
absorption (100 per cent), international reserves were lower.
At the same time, the real exchange rate depreciated
and the inflation rate fell by 15.4 percentage points.
Interestingly, full absorption of aid did not lead to
macroeconomic instability.
About 39 per cent of the aid was absorbed in Zambia,
while 6 per cent was spent. The level of international reserves
increased and the inflation rate declined. The real exchange
rate appreciated. The restrictive macroeconomic stance
resulted in a less encouraging exchange rate outcome.
Table 2
Zambia: Aid Spending (Ratios Expressed as a Share of GDP)
Table 1
Malawi: Aid Spending (Ratios Expressed as a Share of GDP)
Periods Compared 
Amount of aid 
absorbed 
Amount of aid 
spent 
Before aid surge (1999–02) 
vs. aid surge period (2003–06) 
100% 59% 
Relevant aggregates  Relevant periods   
Before aid surge  28.0 
Inflation 
Aid surge period  12.6 
Before aid surge  103.2 
Real effective exchange rate 
Aid surge period  75.5 
Before aid surge  213.3  Average reserves level 
($US millions)  Aid surge period  182.2 
Table 3
Kenya: Aid spending (Ratios Expressed as a Share of GDP)
Periods Compared 
Amount of aid 
absorbed 
Amount of aid 
spent 
Before aid surge (2001–03)  
vs. aid surge period (2004–06)  39% 6% 
Relevant aggregates  Relevant periods   
Before aid surge  21.7 
Inflation 
Aid surge period  18.1 
Before aid surge  108.2 
Real effective exchange rate 
Aid surge period  139.6 
Before aid surge  322.1  Average reserves level 
($US millions)  Aid surge period  373.3 
Periods Compared 
Amount of aid 
absorbed 
Amount of aid 
spent 
Before aid surge (1995-99)  
vs. aid surge period (2000–04)  33%  22% 
Relevant aggregates  Relevant periods   
Before aid surge  6.4 
Inflation 
Aid surge period  4.5 
Before aid surge  69.9 
Real effective exchange rate 
Aid surge period  72.6 
Before aid surge  735  Average reserves level 
($US Millions)  Aid surge period  1,244 
In Kenya, 33 per cent of the aid was absorbed and 22 per
cent was spent. Much of the aid was used to settle domestic
debt and build up reserves. The inflation rate declined and
the exchange rate appreciated. Kenya also adopted a
pre-emptive macroeconomic policy.
The low level of spending in Malawi, Zambia and Kenya is
related to strict macroeconomic conditionalities that limited
fiscal expansion. As a recipient of aid from multilateral
organisations, Malawi was advised to establish a set of
conditionalities to restrict full absorption and spending
of HIV and AIDS-related assistance.
Examples of these conditionalities include
a floor on the net foreign assets of the monetary
authorities; ministries and departments to make
payments centrally to the Accountant General; and
ceilings on central government wages and salaries,
so that they are kept under 7 per cent of the total
budget for wages and salaries.
Malawi’s medium-term objectives and budget
framework were too restrictive to allow MDG levels
of expenditure to be scaled-up. Total government
spending is forecast to fall from 42.9 per cent of GDP
in 2004/2005 to 39.5 per cent in 2010/2011. Revenue
projections are also pessimistic: the forecast is a
decline by 0.3 per cent of GDP. Fiscal policy focuses
on keeping the overall balance at less than 1 per
cent of GDP, and the inflation targets are rates of
under 5 per cent.
According to the IMF (2006, p. 11), “reducing the
domestic debt burden will remain the cornerstone of
the fiscal strategy. This will be attained by expenditure
restraint (wages, goods and services, pensions).”
Indeed, fear of inflationary pressure was so great that
representatives of the Ministry of Finance, during an
interview with one of the authors of this Policy Research
Brief, expressed their concern that too much money
had come into Malawi through aid.
Similarly, in Zambia, a number of macroeconomic
and fiscal measures are in place to curb spending.
The Medium-Term Framework allows for only partial
absorption and very little spending of aid. Fiscal
policy is focused mainly on keeping the overall
balance at under 2 per cent of GDP; the inflation
targets are rates of less than 5 per cent; policy is to
reduce domestic borrowing to less than 1 per cent
of GDP and increasing international reserves.
Kenya also has a conservative monetary policy.
The inflation target agreed upon in the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) programme
and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)
for 2005–2007 was 3.5 per cent.  The PRSP states
that the “objective of the fiscal policy is to maintain
revenues at above 21 percent of GDP and achieve
a sustainable overall deficit (including grants) of
below 3.2 percent of GDP over the 2003/2004–2005/07
period” (Government of Kenya, 2005, p. 32).  However,
since the budget (including grants) was in surplus3
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during the scaling-up period of aid, there was clearly
enough fiscal space to increase spending on HIV and AIDS.
Total public expenditure on health has also been declining
steadily. Meeting Kenya’s National HIV and AIDS Strategic
Plan (KNASP) targets requires an increase in HIV and AIDS
spending from the 2005/06 amount of Ksh25 billion by
2009/2010, or from US$228 million to US$605 million.
A country study by Hailu (2007) calculated a deficit of Ksh 1
billion for the resources required. The share of HIV and AIDS
expenditure has increased over time, but, since public health
spending has not increased; public resources for HIV and
AIDS control are likely to have come from a reallocation of
health expenditure or a reduction in other areas.
III. Potential for Micro Absorption
While spending and absorbing aid are determined by fears
of macroeconomic instability, there is room to focus on
absorption of aid at the microeconomic level. In other words,
while spending and absorbing aid may have macroeconomic
manifestations, the instabilities are often tied to outcomes at
the microeconomic level.
The central point is that the macroeconomic outcomes
depend very much on the quality of the microeconomic
management of HIV initiatives financed by official
development assistance (ODA). If the programmes
and projects at the micro level are responsive to needs
(enterprising), efficiently implemented, able to meet
existing needs (effective), coordinated with other initiatives
(to avoid duplication and encourage positive externalities),
and successful in addressing MDG-related challenges,
the necessary supply response will counter the possibility
of macroeconomic instability (see Serieux et al., 2008).
What is not justified is a pre-emptive approach where
by the macro managers limit the availability of resources
for HIV initiatives without evidence of poor programme
and project selection at the micro level. There should be
constant interaction between the macro and micro
managers, such that HIV initiatives are enterprising,
efficient, effective and coordinated in order to ensure
the appropriate supply responses, while the macro
managers adopt a proactive stance. These issues are
illustrated in Table 4, which presents the four possible
outcomes related to management of HIV initiatives.
The perfect outcome is the one in which macro managers
assume a proactive role by ensuring that all available
resources are disbursed to HIV initiatives, while micro
managers ensure that programmes and projects are
coordinated, properly planned, and implemented both
efficiently and effectively (outcome (1) in the Table 4).
Poor selection of programmes and projects, as well as
poor implementation, result in bottlenecks, replication
and other attributes that limit any supply response.
This in turn entails a high probability of macroeconomic
instability, which leads macro managers to be cautious
and to restrict full spending and absorption of resources.
IV. Country Experiences
The governments of Malawi, Zambia and Kenya have based
their response to the HIV and AIDS epidemic on the principle
of the “Three Ones”. However, a Malawi country study by Hailu
and White (2008) revealed problems of coordination, efficiency
and innovativeness in the response to HIV and AIDS. In
particular, the principle of the Three Ones in Malawi was
compromised by a lack of clarity about the functions of some
of the structures set up to tackle the epidemic, particularly in
relation to the National Aids Commission (NAC). There was
ineffective coordination in the national response, mainly
because of conflicting roles and duplication of efforts.
Interviews with organisations that implement projects
revealed a lack of interaction with macroeconomic
institutions such as the Reserve Bank or the Ministry
of Finance to discuss HIV and AIDS funding-related issues.
With respect to efficiency and effectiveness, we find a lack of
clarity about roles and mandates at the national and district
levels. Efficiency was also hampered by the numerous and
complex conditions attached to aid by donors, and by the
unpredictability of donor funding. Low absorption of
financial resources was also exacerbated by a severe
shortage of human resources, particularly in the health
sector. High vacancy rates in this sector stemmed from poor
working conditions and better paid opportunities working
outside the public health service and/or abroad.
Zambia and Kenya share many of the same problems as
Malawi in micro-managing the response to the HIV and AIDS
crisis, particularly with respect to poor of coordination and
failure to invest adequately in human resources (Hailu and
Njelesani, 2008; Hailu, 2007). In Zambia, about 68 per cent of
professional posts in the health sector are currently unfilled.
Some 70 per cent of posts for doctors, 81 per cent for nurses
and 79 per cent for laboratory technicians are vacant.
According to the National AIDS Spending Assessment, only 1.5
per cent of funding allocated to HIV and AIDS expenditure
was devoted to incentives for human resources. Zambia’s
response is also hindered by donors’ complex procurement
procedures. Hailu and Njelesani (2008) also identified limited
national ownership of HIV and AIDS programmes and
policies, leading to the prioritisation of upward over
downward accountability.
Table 4
Macro and Micro Management Responses to Increased
Aid Flows (for Funding HIV and AIDS Initiatives)
and Likely Outcomes
   Macro Managers 
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be inhibited by the  





















(3) Supply response 
likely to be inhibited by 
the range, efficacy and 
efficiency of projects. 
Macroeconomic 
instability is a distinct 
possibility. 
(4) Responses to HIV 
and AIDS challenges 
are likely to be 
ineffective as well as 
insufficient. 
Macroeconomic 
instability is possible. The views expressed in this brief are the authors’ and not necessarily those of  the Government of Brazil or the United Nations Development Programme.
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The trend in Kenya’s health sector is the same. The policy of
wage ceilings combined with reduced spending has led to a
lack of resources in the sector, including a shortage of
qualified health professionals, medicine and supplies.
The Assistant Minister for Health, for instance, argued that
Kenya urgently needs 10,000 new health workers. To meet
the national targets, Kenya must scale-up expenditure to 4
per cent of its current GDP, which is equivalent to 85 per cent
of total health spending.
Sadly, the failure to spend aid, in conjunction with a policy
of inflation-targeting and cuts in health spending, is the story
in Malawi, Zambia and Kenya. Poor micro-management and
an austere macroeconomic policy stance have effectively
curtailed spending of aid intended for HIV and AIDS control.
These countries need to adopt a proactive macro stance
combined with more effective micro-management.
We offer the following recommendations:
a) Relax the macroeconomic policy and budget framework
in order to allow fiscal stimulus.
b) Improve the coordination, efficiency and effectiveness
of HIV and AIDS programmes and projects.
c) Increase the effectiveness of the national coordinating
agencies, particularly in mobilising and disbursing
resources, as well as engaging donors to streamline
funding requirements.
d) Strengthen the role of the NACs in all countries, which can
lead to greater coordination and communication between
the various actors involved. In Zambia, for example, this
could improve coordination between NGOs and the
government, which is now severely lacking.
e) Encourage the implementation of innovative projects
and programmes (such as workplace programmes and
cash transfer schemes) that tend to have larger welfare
effects, so as to stimulate the supply responses and
increase productivity.
f) Reverse the decline in health expenditure particularly
in light of linkages between HIV and AIDS and other
diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria.
g) Provide debt relief that will create the additional fiscal
space needed to allocate sufficient resources to combat
the HIV and AIDS epidemic.
V. Conclusion
Until very recently, the debate on responding to the HIV and
AIDS crisis centred on donor fatigue among developed countries
and the lack of adequate funds to manage the crisis. For all three
countries studied, funds are not the immediate problem. HIV-
and AIDS-related assistance has increased and is projected to rise
further in the future. Rather, the need is for full absorption and
spending of the funds available. Since both Malawi and Zambia
are among the top 10 countries with the highest prevalence
rates, it is crucial to manage the response effectively. Kenya has a
much lower prevalence rate. Indeed, thanks to a scaling-up of
ODA for HIV and AIDS financing, Kenya’s prevalence rate has
declined significantly. But there is a need to use the existing
resources in order to respond to unmet demand.
Thus, scaling-up and fully absorbing and spending aid for
the alleviation of HIV and AIDS should be the main priority
of these governments, outweighing even macroeconomic
stability in importance. While it is clear that fears of Dutch
Disease are exaggerated and to some extent unfounded,
we argue that proper micro-management, combined with
an expansionary macroeconomic policy and budgetary
framework, can mitigate inflationary pressures and lead
to successful responses. 
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